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Abstract: The implementation of the 2012 Argentinean Supreme Court landmark ruling, which declared
abortion legal in all cases of rape and established standards of implementation of lawful abortions at all
levels of government, shows an uneven pattern of compliance by subnational governments throughout the
country. Based on a case-study of the implementation of the Court’s decision in the province of Salta, this
article advances an explanation of mechanisms that can affect the definition and enforcement of abortion
rights at the local level, in a federation. Drawing on Putnam’s concept of two-level games, it argues that, at
critical junctures, local authorities and especially strong governors with presidential aspirations, may have
electoral incentives at the national level to comply at least partially with national laws and judicial decisions
which are contrary to their own ideological preferences and their local political allegiances. The study suggests
that analyses of political opportunities for local reproductive rights activists in federal regimes should include
the potential two-level games of local authorities, such as politicians with presidential aspirations, and judges
who intend to pursue a career in national or international institutions. Through this analysis, the article
intends to contribute to our understanding of the political determinants of subnational compliance with
national abortion laws and court decisions in federal systems, and more generally, political factors and
dynamics that shape inequities in the protection of women’s rights under federalism. DOI: 10.1080/
09688080.2018.1535687
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Introduction
In Latin America, there are three main types of
abortion law. In a small number of instances,
first trimester abortion at a woman’s request is
legal (Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guyana, Mexico City and
Uruguay). In the majority of countries in the
region, abortion is considered a crime, except
under some circumstances such as to save a
woman’s life, or in cases of rape or risk to the
woman’s health. Finally, four countries have
some of the most restrictive abortion laws in the
world, and completely prohibit the practice
(Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua).
Argentina, like most other Latin American
countries, criminalises abortion in all stages of
pregnancy. Abortion is allowed only in cases of
rape or when the life or health of the woman is
at risk. Nevertheless, the effective implementation
of even this restrictive law has been jeopardised by
a series of factors, among them the reluctance of
subnational authorities to comply with national
laws and decisions issued by national courts. This
has produced a pattern of inequality throughout
the country, in women’s access to the right to
reproductive health, especially given the federal
system of government. It confirms Smulovitz’s
claim that in countries with federal systems, terri-
torial location should be included as a component
of social inequality, in addition to socio-economic
factors.1 Based on the study of the case of Salta,
Argentina, this article aims to contribute to our
understanding of the political determinants of
compliance with national norms by subnational
authorities in federal systems, and more generally
to the understanding of the mechanisms that
affect unequal enforcement of women’s rights in
national territories under federalism.
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One of the main landmarks in the struggle for
the liberalisation of abortion laws in Argentina
was the 2012 Supreme Court decision in the F.,
A.L. case, in which the Court declared that article
86 of the Criminal Code (of 1921) should be inter-
preted as decriminalising abortion in all cases of
rape (and not only in cases of mentally handi-
capped women).2 This ruling intended to resolve
a long-standing legal dispute in the country regard-
ing the right to abortion under this exception. The
Court also urged subnational authorities to issue
protocols applying to all non-punishable abortions
in accordance with detailed criteria established by
the Court, among which was that the only require-
ment for women to have access to abortion ser-
vices in cases of rape was their declaration
(declaración jurada) in a public hospital.
The Decision by the Supreme Court has not been
enforced equally throughout the country. Accord-
ing to a Report by the Association of Civil Rights
(ADC), in 2015, eight provinces had protocols that
met the Court’s directives (in two provinces, proto-
cols existed already); eight jurisdictions (seven pro-
vinces and the City of Buenos Aires) had protocols
that only partially complied with the Court’s cri-
teria; and eight provinces had not issued
protocols.3
In 2012, the highly conservative Governor of the
province of Salta, which is considered a bastion of
traditionalism, responded to the Supreme Court’s
ruling by immediately declaring that no protocol
would be issued in this province. However, Salta
ended up being the first province to comply,
though partially and insufficiently, with the Court’s
Decision. This study analyses the process in the
Salta case, drawing on Putnam’s4 conceptualis-
ation of two-level games in international relations.
It argues that local authorities, concerned simul-
taneously with local and national pressures (and,
in particular, strong governors with presidential
aspirations), may comply at least partially with
national norms due to electoral incentives at the
national level, beyond their ideological prefer-
ences and their local political allegiances. In this
way, two-level games, and pressures from both
local constituencies and national political forces
can shape local abortion norms and the
implementation of national laws and judicial
decisions at the subnational level. This argument
can apply also to local judges who, beyond ideo-
logical preferences and local interests, also care
about their reputation at national and inter-
national levels.
Given the historic reluctance to comply with
norms regarding lawful abortions, and that in
Argentina most of the power and competencies
for implementation of abortion services lie in
local governments, we can anticipate that the
unequal implementation of national abortion
norms will continue to be an issue even if abortion
at a woman’s request is legalised in this country. In
2018, a bill to legalise abortion on request was
approved in the House of Deputies but fell seven
votes short in the Senate. In Argentina, as in
most other Latin American countries except Méx-
ico, the main Codes (Civil, Commercial, Criminal,
Labour, etc.) are enacted by the national Congress.
However, in Argentina, the provinces intervene in
the regulation of those laws, and the implemen-
tation of protocols for lawful abortions is under
the jurisdiction of local governments through
their health ministries. Moreover, most of the
cost of health services is met by the provinces.
This has followed the decentralisation process in
the late 1980s and 1990s when the funding and
administration of the health sector became a pro-
vincial responsibility.5,6
Understanding the mechanisms that can affect
local government’s compliance with national direc-
tives is highly relevant for the analysis of abortion
rights politics and policies under federalism in
Argentina, and arguably elsewhere. At the same
time, this can also contribute to understanding
the political factors and dynamics that lead to ter-
ritorial inequities in terms of access to women’s
rights in federal systems. Drawing on the study of
the political process of implementation of national
abortion directives in the province of Salta, this
article advances an explanation of one of the
mechanisms that can affect the timing and content
of subnational compliance with national laws, and
in this way contribute to determine the shape of
local abortion norms.
Research for this study included surveying news
articles from local and national newspapers, analy-
sis of legal documents, and 12 in-person interviews
with feminist activists, academics, journalists and
historians, conducted by the author in the city of
Salta in 2013. The analysis follows process tracing,
a qualitative tool for identifying explanatory mech-
anisms in within-case studies.7,8 Identification of
the chain of events, and analysis of incentives
and conditions was undertaken, to explain the
hypothesised two-level game mechanism in the
Salta case. The first section presents the theoretical
perspective, which analyses how the two-level
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game theory developed by Putnam for the field of
international relations can apply to the analysis of
subnational politics of abortion in federal systems.
The second section traces the process of implemen-
tation of the Supreme Court F., A.L. Decision in
Salta, and analyses the interaction between local
and national factors that contributed to shape
the current abortion regulation in this province.
Theoretical perspective: two-level games
under federalism
Gender and federalism scholars have analysed the
impact of state architecture on gender politics and
policies across national territories.1,6,9–12 Although
there are mixed positions regarding the advan-
tages and disadvantages of federalism for the
implementation of gender policies, this literature
generally agrees that the delegation of policy
powers to subnational units leads to the uneven
enforcement of women’s rights throughout
national territories.1 Work in this field regarding
the Argentinean case has argued that variations
in the implementation of women’s rights across
the country are due to: the intensity of the local
electoral competition and the strength of women’s
organisational capacity;1 political parties’ positions
and the ideology and number of women legis-
lators;10 and the way party dynamics are territoria-
lised, i.e. linked to local concerns, leading local
politicians to defend local interests.6 This article
intends to contribute to this field by analysing a
mechanism not previously considered by the litera-
ture: the two-level games of subnational
authorities.
Federalism empowers local authorities and in
cases of so-called robust federalism such as Argen-
tina, Mexico and Brazil, governors have significant
autonomy and resources, and politicians have
strong incentives to respond firstly to local inter-
ests.13 The positive aspect of robust federalism is
that governors committed to reform can be deci-
sive actors in affecting changes despite difficulties
in advancing policies at the national level.13 How-
ever, local leaders may also resist the implemen-
tation of progressive national laws or court
decisions. As shown by Franceschet and Piscopo,
in the implementation of national laws on repro-
ductive rights in Argentina, provincial politicians
respond to local dynamics, with the provinces’
degree of traditionalism being a prominent fac-
tor.6 Not only may traditionalism and conservatism
at the local level generally affect the enforcement
of rights, but also, as Vickers observes, traditional-
ism and “territorial pluralism” are often explicitly
invoked by local authorities and conservative
actors in federal systems to resist reforms and
the advancement of women’s and sexual min-
orities’ rights.12
Informal norms and institutions contribute to
explaining local variations regarding the enforce-
ment of women’s rights in federal systems.14 In
Latin America, cultural understandings about the
proper separation between the spheres of State
and Church are a key part of traditionalist informal
norms, and a crucial element to be considered in
the analysis of political opportunities for feminist
mobilisation in subnational entities. In these con-
texts, informal norms and institutions that regulate
the relationship between State and Church at the
local level may, in fact, explain provincial leaders’
resistance to implementing national laws on
women’s rights, beyond their personal preferences.
This may be so particularly when institutional
incentives, such as the way parties are organised
under federalism, lead local politicians to respond
first to local interests.6
In certain junctures, however, politicians who
usually respond first to local interests, may also
have incentives to comply at least partially with
national laws and judicial decisions which are con-
trary to their own preferences and local political
allegiances. In Argentina, strong Governors are
powerful actors in the national arena and have
an interest in building a reputation in the national
public sphere, especially given that ex-governors
have often occupied the national presidency.
These local politicians are concerned with main-
taining a national image of compliance with the
rule of law and democratic practices. In Argentina,
as in other Latin American countries, local tradi-
tionalist practices and informal institutions coexist
with the symbolic importance of discourse on
human rights, the rule of law, and democracy, par-
ticularly at national level. Subnational authorities
are thus attentive to factors at local and national
levels. At critical junctures, strong governors with
presidential aspirations may play a two-level
game, responding on the one hand to local consti-
tuencies, but also to national pressure for compli-
ance with national directives. This argument can
also apply to other local actors, such as judges,
who are also attentive to the public discussion on
controversial issues15 and are also interested in
their national and international image, and may
have career-related incentives.
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Within the field of gender and federalism
studies, the conceptualisation of two-level games
was advanced to refer to the behaviour of feminist
activists, who can take advantage of the opportu-
nity offered by federal systems to choose among
different levels of government.9 Drawing on Put-
nam’s theory of two-level games, we use this con-
cept in a different way. In his study of the
politics of international negotiations, Putnam
argues that “moves that are rational for country
leaders on one board might be impolitic for the
same actors at the other one”.4 Incentives in the
two arenas are different, and politicians are atten-
tive to both games, trying to reconcile, at the same
time, domestic and international pressures.4 This,
according to Putnam, results in their adopting pol-
icies which cannot be explained by either a purely
domestic or international analysis.4
If we apply this rationale to the analysis of sub-
national-national political dynamics, we can see
that subnational authorities who have electoral
and career incentives at the national level, on
occasion are led to pay attention to national
imperatives, even if this entails downplaying
their own position based on local interests. This
is a political opportunity that can be seized by
organised feminist movements at the subnational
level. A condition for two-level games to work in
these cases is the availability of mechanisms of
accountability forged by organised feminist acti-
vism at the local level and their connection with
committed journalists working on gender issues
in national media. If these factors exist, shaming
mechanisms can be activated rapidly and activists
can seize the opportunity to create momentum
and to pressure local authorities to comply with
national norms.
Tracing subnational partial compliance
in the Salta case
Compliance with the 2012 Supreme Court F., A.L.
Decision has been uneven in the Argentinean pro-
vinces. Salta, an emblematic example of tradition-
alism, and headed by a conservative and initially
defiant Governor, is not the worst case in the
country in terms of formal implementation of
the ruling. By tracing the political process that
led to the government’s partial compliance with
the Court’s directives, we can assess the national
and local dynamics that shaped this policy result.
After the Supreme Court’s Decision of 13 March
2012, Salta’s Governor Juan Manuel Urtubey
(elected in 2007, reelected in 2011 and 2015),
openly defied it. On 20 March, he declared he
would not comply with the decision, and that in
Salta, abortions in cases of rape would only be car-
ried out if a judge authorised the practice, a pro-
cess explicitly outlawed by the Court.16,17 Urtubey
said that the Court’s interpretation of the Penal
Code was “an opinion”, and that his province
would not make changes on this issue until the
law was modified by the National Congress.18 In
his first response to the Court’s Decision, the Gover-
nor spoke in accordance with his own religious
convictions, as well as to his local constituencies
and elite allies.
Salta is one of the most traditional provinces in
the country, with a conservative social structure
and Catholic forces with a strong influence on
the State. Interviewees for this study characterise
part of the elite sectors in Salta, who are proud
of the Province’s colonial past, as the “last bastions
of Hispanic conservatism in the country” (see Note 1).
With regard to the influence of religious forces
on the State, Salta is a jurisdiction that grants
high formal privileges to the Catholic Church
through constitutional provisions,19 and informal
rules and cultural understandings reinforce the
capacity of the Church to influence public policies.
In the words of an interviewee, “in Salta, Catholi-
cism is part of the cultural matrix, and there is a
perceived superposition between culture and reli-
gion” (see Note 2). Since the current Governor,
Juan Manuel Urtubey took office, the ultra-conser-
vative Catholic group Opus Dei gained ascendancy
in the local State’s structure (see Note 1). Urtubey
appointed Opus Dei members to key positions
responsible for the rights of women and vulnerable
groups, such as the Minister of Education and the
office of the Public Defender of Minors (see Note
2). During the past decade, it became known
nationally that this province did not comply with
the National Programme of Comprehensive Sexual
Education (created in 2006), and that educational
materials from the National Ministry of Education
were returned without being used.20 Moreover,
the government allowed the practice of religious
education at public schools, which was eventually
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in 2017.21
The Governor’s declarations in 2012 were met
by a strong reaction from local feminist activists
from the two main networks that form an active
and diverse feminist movement in Salta: the Multi-
sectorial de Mujeres (Women’s Multisectoral
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Organisation) founded in 2003, and the Foro de
Mujeres por la Igualdad de Oportunidades
(Women’s Forum for Equal Opportunities), created
in 2004 (see Notes 3–5). Feminist activists in Salta
established links with feminist journalists working
at a major national newspaper, Página/12, as well
as with alternative feminist media with national
reach, such as Comunicar Igualdad;22 their report-
ing has been a key element in the feminist struggle
for women’s rights in this province. In particular,
reporting by feminist journalist Mariana Carbajal,
who had previously covered other cases of viola-
tions of women’s rights in Salta and other pro-
vinces for Página/12, was instrumental in making
Urtubey’s defiance known nationwide. The Gover-
nor’s stance was also widely criticised through
social networks.23 As pointed out by interviewees
for this study, Salta has built a reputation as a pro-
vince where violence against women is rampant,
and “any news about machismo and violation of
women’s rights in Salta has immediate resonance
at the national level” (see Note 2).
The national reverberations of the case had an
impact on the Governor’s further actions on this
issue. As observed by Violeta Carrique, a prominent
feminist activist in Salta, the culture of human
rights permeates society, and makes it politically
incorrect to express an openly machista position.
Thus, judges and politicians attempt to appear pro-
gressive, and to show that they are incorporating a
human rights framework in their work (see Note 6).
Several interviewees for this study also pointed out
that Urtubey is interested in maintaining an image
of compliance with national gender equality
norms, and the rule of law more generally, due
to his presidential aspirations. According to an
interviewee, his government was concerned
about being shamed at the national level: “it was
a media scandal, and Urtubey does not like
media scandals” (see Note 7). Urtubey’s presiden-
tial aspirations have been widely publicised.24 It
was also pointed out that, after the scandal, “he
was pressured by national authorities from his
own party to comply, because no local politician
with presidential aspirations can appear openly
defiant of a Supreme Court ruling” (see Note 3).
As expressed by an interviewee for this study, the
government “rebels against national norms on
women’s rights until the media makes it public”
(see Note 1).
On 22 March 2012, Urtubey issued Decree 1170/
12, in which he instructed the provincial Ministries
of Public Health and of Human Rights to
immediately elaborate a protocol on abortions in
cases of rape.25 In a significant shift from the Gov-
ernor’s initial declarations, the Decree stated that
“the institutional importance of the Supreme
Court’s Decision cannot be ignored”, and it did
not include the requirement of judicial authoris-
ation of abortions in cases of rape. However,
against the Court’s directive that the only require-
ment was the woman’s declaration (declaración
jurada) of the rape, the Decree established that
this declaration should be made with tutelary
assistance by the Public Ministry (or that the
woman should file a criminal complaint of the
rape). This renders the practice bureaucratic and
creates undue obstacles to access to lawful abor-
tions. Following those criteria, on 22 May, a Proto-
col on non-punishable abortions was issued by
Salta’s Ministry of Public Health.26 As well as the
limitations mentioned, the protocol included
only the regulation of non-punishable abortions
in cases of rape, and not therapeutic abortions,
as had been indicated by the Supreme Court. In
addition, the Protocol established that therapeutic
abortions would be carried out only during the first
12 weeks of pregnancy, although the Court had not
established any time-period.
Given that the Protocol did not comply with the
Court’s rule, on 25 April 2013, local women’s rights
advocates submitted an action of unconstitutional-
ity before Salta’s Superior Tribunal, against the
Governor’s Decree and the provincial Protocol.
The claim was presented by the Foro de Mujeres
por la Igualdad de Oportunidades, through its Pre-
sident, Irene Cari, sponsored by attorneys Graciela
Abbut Carol and Mónica Menini. Public Defender
Natalia Buira also joined the claim, on grounds
that the Protocol imposed obligations on officials
at the Public Ministry that were outside of their jur-
isdiction. On 12 July 2013, Salta’s Superior Tribunal
issued a decision in which it rejected the claim and
upheld the constitutionality of the questioned
norms.27
Finally, on May 24th 2018, Urtubey issued Decree
584/18, in which Salta’s government adopted the
National Protocol for the Legal Interruption of Preg-
nancy, in accordance with the directives of the F.,
A.L. ruling.28 The Governor’s decision was the result
of a national scandal regarding the tragic situation of
a 10-year-old girl in Salta, who was denied a legal
abortion by local authorities because the pregnancy
exceeded the 12-week time-period established by
Salta’s Protocol. Local activists from Foro de Mujeres
contacted journalist Mariana Carbajal, who made
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this case known nationwide on May 22nd through
her twitter account, with additional reporting
the following day.29 This provoked a cascade of
criticism, and the subsequent policy change,
confirming the effectiveness of shaming mechan-
isms and demonstrating the interplay of two-
level games by governors concerned with their
national reputation.
Conclusions
The analysis of the implementation of national
abortion norms in the Argentinean province of
Salta shows that among the mechanisms that can
influence different patterns of subnational compli-
ance in this field under federal regimes are the
two-level games played by local authorities. In
the name of tradition and territorial pluralism,
subnational authorities may defy national dictates
on abortion rights. Conservative officials can
attempt to block laws for women’s rights and to
act against decisions by national courts, following
their own ideology and the preferences of their
local constituencies. However, at the same time,
these actors may also have strategic concerns
regarding their electoral prospects at the national
level, and care about their national image. At criti-
cal junctures, reputational concerns due to elec-
toral incentives at the national level can take
precedence over local interests, leading conserva-
tive governors to reassess the convenience of defy-
ing national directives on women’s rights, and
abortion rights, in particular. In this case, this
interplay, or two-level game, between local and
national interests resulted in a situation of partial
compliance with national abortion norms.
The Salta case-study highlights the role of mech-
anisms of shaming and accountability, in creating
a critical juncture and opening opportunities for
two-level games to take place. This study points
out two conditions for these mechanisms to
work: the presence of active feminist organisations
at the subnational level, and their connections
with journalists working in major national media
outlets who report on their claims.
The study suggests that the two-level game the-
ory developed by Putnam for the field of inter-
national relations contributes to the analysis of
the political opportunities for local reproductive
rights activists in federal systems. It also contrib-
utes to an explanation of the factors that shape
subnational variations and inequalities in the
enforcement of reproductive rights across
national territories under federalism. The argu-
ment focuses on gender norms and reproductive
rights, areas especially sensitive amongst tradi-
tionalist local elites. Further research could test
the validity of two-level game theory for studying
other situations of subnational implementation
of national norms, for example in the field of
environmental regulation or regarding the rights
of aboriginal peoples and other marginalised
social groups.
Notes
1. Miguel Angel Cáceres, History Professor, verbal
communication, 9 August 2013.
2. Agustín Gómez Augier, Journalist, President of
ILEC- Salta, verbal communication 13 August,
2013.
3. Mónica Menini, Legal Advisor of Foro de
Mujeres, verbal communication, 7 August 2013.
4. Alicia Ramos, President of Multisectorial de
Mujeres, verbal communication, 10 August
2013.
5. Verónica Spaventa, Law Clerk, verbal com-
munication, 4 August 2013.
6. Violeta Carrique, President of the Women’s
Commission, National University of Salta, ver-
bal communication, 18 August 2013.
7. Graciela Abbut Carol, Litigant lawyer, legal
advisor of Foro de Mujeres, verbal communi-
cation, 8 August 2013.
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Résumé
L’application de la décision historique de la Cour
suprême argentine de 2012, qui a déclaré l’avorte-
ment légal dans tous les cas de viol et a établi les
normes de mise en œuvre des avortements auto-
risés par la loi à tous les niveaux administratifs,
montre des modalités inégales de respect de la
part des autorités sous-nationales dans le pays.
Resumen
La aplicación del fallo histórico de 2012 por la
Corte Suprema de Justicia de Argentina, que
declaró el aborto legal en todos los casos de viola-
ción y estableció normas de ejecución de abortos
legales en todos los niveles del gobierno, muestra
un patrón desigual de cumplimiento por gobiernos
subnacionales en toda la nación. A raíz de un
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Fondé sur une étude de cas de l’application de la
décision de la Cour dans la province de Salta, cet
article avance une explication des mécanismes qui
peuvent influer sur la définition et l’exécution des
droits à l’avortement au niveau local, dans une féd-
ération. S’inspirant du concept de Putnam de jeux à
deux niveaux, il affirme que, dans des moments cri-
tiques, les autorités locales et particulièrement les
gouverneurs forts qui ont des aspirations présiden-
tielles, peuvent avoir des encouragements élector-
aux au niveau national les incitant à respecter au
moins partiellement les lois nationales et les
décisions judiciaires contraires à leurs propres pré-
férences idéologiques et leurs engagements poli-
tiques locaux. L’étude suggère que les analyses des
opportunités politiques offertes aux militants
locaux des droits reproductifs dans les régimes féd-
éraux devraient inclure les jeux potentiels à deux
niveaux des autorités locales, comme les politiciens
avec des aspirations présidentielles, et des juges
qui souhaitent poursuivre une carrière dans les
institutions nationales ou internationales. Par
cette analyse, l’article entend contribuer à notre
compréhension des déterminants politiques du
respect sous-national des lois nationales sur l’avor-
tement et des décisions judiciaires dans des sys-
tèmes fédéraux, et, plus généralement, des
facteurs politiques et des dynamiques qui façon-
nent les inégalités dans la protection des droits
des femmes dans le fédéralisme.
estudio de caso de aplicación de la decisión de la
Corte en la provincia de Salta, este artículo pre-
senta una explicación de los mecanismos que pue-
den afectar la definición y el cumplimiento del
derecho al aborto a nivel local, en una federación.
Basándose en el concepto de Putnam del juego de
doble nivel, argumenta que, en momentos críticos,
las autoridades locales y especialmente goberna-
dores influyentes con aspiraciones presidenciales,
podrían tener incentivos electorales a nivel nacio-
nal para cumplir por lo menos parcialmente con
las leyes nacionales y decisiones judiciales contra-
rias a sus propias preferencias ideológicas y sus
lealtades políticas locales. El estudio sugiere que
los análisis de oportunidades políticas para activis-
tas locales que abogan por los derechos reproduc-
tivos en regímenes federales deberían incluir el
potencial de juegos de doble nivel de las autori-
dades locales, tales como políticos con aspira-
ciones presidenciales, y jueces que piensan seguir
una carrera en instituciones nacionales o interna-
cionales. Por medio de este análisis, el artículo pro-
cura contribuir a nuestra comprensión de los
determinantes políticos de cumplimiento subna-
cional con las leyes nacionales sobre aborto y deci-
siones judiciales en sistemas federales, y de
manera más general, de los factores políticos y
dinámicas que definen las desigualdades en la pro-
tección de los derechos de las mujeres bajo el
federalismo.
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